Date of publication: 2017-09-01 06:50
And now, thanks to some great wave machine technology you can actually see how waves can form patterns / numbers. Thus you can see for yourselves how mathematical logic can exist in the universe due to the logical interconnection of wave patterns.
The third antirealist theory of epistemic justification is that of error theory (or, sometimes, fictionalism). Unlike subjectivism and expressivism, error theory does not invoke, one way or another, noncognitive attitudes. Error theorists take their justification judgments to purport to describe respective justification facts but deny that such facts really exist (compare Olson 7566a, 7566b). Given the absence of such facts (typically considered to be truthmakers), we end up with an error theory, namely, a theory that suggests that justification judgments are uniformly false at least all first-order justification judgments are false (compare Olson 7566a, 7566b).
The experiment. Imagine an idealist philosopher in an airplane at 85,555 feet. A ten second timer is activated that will eject the 'philosopher' from the plane. They are wearing a parachute, but it is not fastened. They must decide if they wish to fasten themselves to the parachute or not.
This eliminates idealist philosophers / philosophy- they either fasten the parachute and thus acknowledge the truth of physical reality - or they do not and fall to their death!
Hume is saying that once we know the causal connection between things, we could deduce with certainty the effects, and they would always match the effects we in fact see, . logical truths = empirical truths.
And Popper acknowledged the truth of this. (It seems though that postmodern philosophy has forgotten this fact in their haste to say that we cannot know the absolute truth about physical reality).
Metaphysically speaking, it cannot be the case that two naturalistically identical situations (at least in the epistemically relevant aspects) realize inconsistent epistemic properties. There must be some naturalistic difference at the base level that grounds some difference at the normative-supervening level, otherwise there is no good reason why the supervenient-normative properties should be inconsistent. To illustrate, suppose that there are two naturalistically indistinguishable cases where a dead body has been found. It would be unreasonable to think that the one case justifies the belief in a homicide while the second justifies the belief in a suicide—unless of course there is at least some relevant naturalistic difference in the two cases.
The result of the joint rejection of factualism and cognitivism is a novel metasemantic framework that does not understand meaning on the basis of truth and reference (and truth-conditions) but on the basis of the notion of expression of states of mind (though, for a recent non-content-centric exposition of expressivism see Charlow 7569). Truth is not built in the rudiments of the semantic theory at first instance. Sophisticated, non-classical expressivists (compare Blackburn 6998, 6998) like to appeal to a deflationary account of normative truth, but even then truth is not a primitive component of their metasemantic theory, but only a derivative of the mental states expressed.
To see how one can argue that the Semantic Theory of Truth can be used to explicate the truth of noncontingent propositions, consider the following series of propositions, the first four of which are contingent, the fifth of which is noncontingent:
Some others have seen the open question argument as evidence for an antireductionist but realist theory while others, more sympathetic to both antireductionism and methodological naturalism, have seen it as evidence for antireductionist antirealist theories like error theory or expressivism (compare Ayer 6986). They suggested that we have entrenched “open feel” semantic intuitions because no reduction (analytic or synthetic) of normative properties (moral or epistemic) is forthcoming. Since there are no such properties, the quest for reduction is therefore quixotic.
The idea is to define the predicate "is true" when it is applied to the simplest (that is, the non-complex or atomic) sentences in the object language (a language, see above, which does not, itself, contain the truth-predicate "is true"). The predicate "is true" is a predicate that occurs only in the metalanguage, ., in the language we use to describe the object language. At the second stage, his theory shows how the truth predicate, when it has been defined for propositions expressed by sentences of a certain degree of grammatical complexity, can be defined for propositions of the next greater degree of complexity.
Without assertions in this argument having truth-values, regardless of whether we know those values, we could not assess the argument using the canons of deductive validity and invalidity. We would have to say – contrary to deeply-rooted philosophical intuitions – that it is not really an argument at all. (For another sort of rebuttal to the claim that propositions about the future cannot be true prior to the occurrence of the events described, see Logical Determinism.)
A core component of epistemic metaphysics concerns ontology. Epistemic ontology explores questions about the existence and nature of epistemic properties like epistemic justification, warrant, rationality, entitlement, understanding, truth, wisdom, knowledge, epistemic duties, and norms like, “You ought to trust your senses, unless you have reason to doubt their overall reliability” and particular epistemic facts like, “The theory of evolution is well-justified, given the abundant empirical evidence.”
i) To keep the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) in mind (thus matter is a spatially extended spherical standing wave structure of the universe, not a tiny particle).
The absolute argument against idealism is Darwinian evolution. It is necessary that the physical reality of the earth and sun existed prior to our evolution, thus prior to our mind's evolution. There are many common traits of the human mind which confirm that we evolved as animals on the surface of the earth. . We sleep, get hungry, seek pleasure, avoid pain, love others and lust for sexual reproduction. Idealism does not explain this - evolving as sexually reproducing animals on the surface of the earth does. Thus matter is a priori to mind. Popper's comments on idealism are pretty spot on
As one might expect, there have been a number of responses on behalf of deontologism. Some have blankly denied the involuntarism intuition and insisted that we can at least sometimes directly decide what to believe (for example, Ginet 7556). Others have denied that responsibility is exhausted by the absence of direct control (for example, Feldman 7556). We might have no direct control over the working of our heart but we might still be to some extent responsible for its proper working because we can take steps to indirectly enhance its functioning. After all, we can have a healthy lifestyle that includes a pro-heart diet, exercising, regular medical exams, and so forth